Livers wcth lesions are an cmportant quality aspect among slaughter pig producers and slaughterhouses. Total losses of non-marketable livers with lesions, lower growth and higher feed intake of pegs en the Netherlands en 2003 were estimated at €3.5 mcllion. The major cause of liver lescons cs the roundworm Ascans suum. Worm treatment on the farm can be effective in reducing liver lesions. Before July 2004 an insurance with a fixed premium for each slaughtered pig was in place in the Netherlands to compensate slaughterhouses for pathological lesions. Individual peg producers had low incentcves to take control measures. In July 2004 a new incentive mechamsm was introduced: a reductcon in the payment of €1 for each peg with a liver lescon. Thcs placed the financcal burden of levers with lescons on the producer, thereby cncreasmg cncentcves to treat roundworm infectcons. We analysed the data of 1,104 farms wcth 55,802 deliveries from 2003 to 2006. The mean liver lesion inccdence decreased from 8% in 2003 when a collectcve msurance was in place to 5% in 2006, after the change to the price reduction . Of the producers, 68% reduced liver lesion mcidence . Of the producers wcth an cncreased incidence, 83% showed a low cncrease (less than 5%). We conclude that the pnce reduction was effect1ve m reducmg the mean mccdence of liver lescons. although large differences between cnd1vidual producers exist. Further research is needed to determme what causes these large differences.
Introduction
Livers with lescons are an important quality aspect among p1g producers and slaughterhouses Since the late 1990s the mean liver lesion inccdence in slaughter pegs m the Netherlands was high, fluctuatmg between 8 and 12%. The majority of liver defections are caused by an infection wcth the roundworm Ascans suum. Application of anthelmentica (worm mediccnes) on group level through inject1on , feed or water cs generally suffic1ent to reduce the incidence to 2-4%, although effectiveness depends on the actcve mgredient and the extent of cmplementatcon of the treatment in the producers' management Treatment costs are around €0.85 per delivered peg when medicine is applied three tcmes Smce pathologically deformed livers are unfit for human consumptcon, slaughterhouses must dispose of livers wcth lescons. Further financcal losses mclude a lower growth , hcgher feed cntake, and lower meat percentage as a result of an infectcon with Ascans suum. Loss est1mates vary from €0.85 to €4 .50 for an cnfected peg , depending on the infectcon level. Total losses en the Netherlands in 2003 were est1mated at €3.5 mcllcon (Bondi eta/ 2004) EU legcslallon (EG/854/2004) prescribes that all pigs delivered for slaughter must be assessed cndividually for pathologccal lesions dcrectly after slaughter Thcs was already prescribed by Dutch legislation . The procedure is documented en the handbook for IKB-encodcng developed by the Natconal Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat (RW) in the early 1990s The mspection of the carcasses is conducted by official assistants. under the supervcscon of veterinarians from the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA). Thcs guarantees the mdependency of the assessment. The assessment of livers cs based on the degree of infection wcth the roundworm Ascaris suum When larvae have migrated through the liver the cmmune response leads to cnflammatory tcssue in the liver that shows as white spots. A liver has mcnor lesions if it has one or two white spots on the front side of the liver and declared unfit for human consumption -and consequently rejected -if it has three or more white spots. To compensate slaughterhouses for the resulting economic losses of slaughter lesions a mandatory collective insurance was in place. A p1g producer paid a fixed insurance premium per pig delivered to a Dutch slaughterhouse. Until July 2004 rejected livers were part of the insurance. Smce a lower rejected liver incidence did not directly result in a lower premium -and thus in lower costs -msuffic1ent incentives for an individual producer existed to implement control measures to reduce liver lesion incidence. To reduce the financial losses caused by liver lesions, in 2004 the Dutch pig sector created a new financial 1ncentive mechanism to 1nduce mdividual p1g producers to control liver lesion Incidence. Such incentives are commonly used in agricultural supply chains to induce growers to provide processors with the correct amount of raw matenals of the desired quality at the correct time (e.g. Hueth and L1gon 2002; Martinez and Zering 2004) . According to incentive theory increas1ng the financial consequences of production risks should induce producers to take act1on to control the risks (Prendergast 1999 ). On 5 July 2004 -the first Monday 1n July -a new incentive mechanism was introduced m the Netherlands aimed at putting the costs where they origmate: a direct pnce reduction in the payment to a pig producer of €1 for each delivered pig with a liver les1on . Th1s price reduction places the financial consequences of liver lesions on the producers , theoretically increasing the mcentives for them to treat roundworm infections. This paper describes the effect of the introduction of the price reduction on liver lesion Incidence.
Material and methods
To show the effects of the change from the insurance to the price reduction we used a dataset with slaughter data of individual p1gs of a pig slaughter company w1th multiple locations in the Netherlands. In the analys1s we used livers with lesions, the sum of rejected livers and livers with mmor lesions, as 1) both are caused by Ascaris suum and 2) coding problems made it impossible to identify rejected livers from livers with minor lesions in time. The data included 213,398 deliveries of herds of 7,532 different producers from January 2003 to September 2006, mcluding internal delivenes and imports. Deliveries from the analysis that could not be traced directly to a specific producer, such as internal deliveries and imports, were excluded. We also excluded small producers (less than 500 slaughter p1gs a year}, s1nce often pigs are a -possibly less commercial -side activity on these farms and these producers might therefore be innuenced less by a financial incentive. Th1s resulted in 1,104 producers With 55,802 deliveries to be used in the analys1s. We tested 1f the distribution of liver lesion incidence over producers in the sample correctly represented the whole dataset. A Kolmogorov-Sm1rnov test-stat1st1c of 0.05 Indicated that h1s indeed 1s the case. We est1mated the effects of the price reduction by companng the weighted mean of the liver lesion incidence before with the weighted mean after 5 July 2004. The unit of analysis was a delivery and weighmg factors were the delivery s1ze Because p1g producers in the Netherlands are free to choose between slaughter compan1es , a decrease 1n the mean inc1dence of livers with les1ons measured at a slaughterhouse could be caused by producers switching slaughterhouses. Therefore we used producers that ttrat did not change slaughterhouses and delivered before and after the change The literature IS not clear on whether the current intensive pig husbandry systems as used m the Netherlands have a seasonal innuence on liver les1on mc1dence . By usmg the same penod before and after the change we overcame possible seasonal inOuences. We defined 1 July 1 2003 to 30 June 2004 as the msurance penod (sample X1) and 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 as the price reduction period (sample X2) To determine the impact of the price reduction we tested if the we1ghted mean liver lesion incidence 1n the Insurance period was Significantly h1gher than 1n the pnce reduction period using the pa1red data from X1 and X2 . The null hypothesis was HO: ~J(X2-X1) ;:: 0, w1th 1J(X2-X1) the we1ghted mean of X2-X1 The data were analysed w1th SAS 9.1
Res ults
F1gure 1 insurance penod X1 and the price reductron period X2. The incidence of livers with lesions in the insurance penod was around 7-9% wrth a standard deviation (not in figure 1 ) of 8-10%. The incrdence remained at thrs level until April 2005. Then the incidence of livers with lesions decreased rn a few months to 4-5% in August 2005, where it remamed. The standard devratron decreased to around 5-6%. The decline in liver lesion incidence started ten months after the introduction of the price reduction. This can be explained by producers only startmg to apply worm treatment in new groups after 5 July 2004 and by the time it takes for the treatment to become effective. After rmplementation of the treatment it takes 6 to 18 months to sufficrently decrease infection pressure rn the housrng to actually reduce liver lesion incrdence Table 2 grves basic wrth delivery size werghted statistics of the liver lesron rncrdence rn the two periods The mean decreased from 7 5 to 5.1% and the 95% percentile decreased from 26.8 to 15 5%. The drfferences between producers reduced as indicated by the decreased standard devratron from 8.5% rn penod 1 to 5.5% in penod 2 We tested HO. ~(X2-X1) ~ 0. Because X2-X1 was not drstnbuted normally -Kolmogorov-Smrrnov test statistic for goodness of fit for a normal distribution equals 0 19 -we used bootstrapprng (1 ,000 rteratrons with seed 0) to test for thrs difference. The results showed that the drfference was srgnrficantly drfferent from 0 at P < 0 001 Alternatively, interpretmg the data as a time series, we performed a predrcllon test We forecast liver lesron rncidence 1n the period of the price reduction usmg the data of the msurance penod on a weekly basrs. The actual observed weekly incidences from July 2005 onwards lay outside the 95% confidence rnterval of the forecast, mdicallng a srgmficant decrease at the 5% level 1 PS· 5% percentile and P95 95% percentrle
We observed differences between indivrdual producer's liver lesron rncrdence developments from the insurance penod to the pnce reductron period Table 3 gives werghted (wrth delivery size) statrstrcs of the distributron of producer developments The mean development was -2.4% and the median development -0 .9% The standard deviation was 7.3%, 1ndrcatrng a spread between the developments of Individual producers Of the 1,1 04 producers 753 showed a decrease in liver lesion incidence rang1ng from 0% to -46 1% Of the 352 producers with an Increase 295 showed an rncrease less than 5 0%. The maxrmum increase was 30 9% Because of the use of emp1rical data , non-observed external factors such as climate , housing or the assessment procedure could have contributed to the decrease in liver lesion incidence. Available data from a German slaughterhouse showed that the liver les1on mcidence rema1ned around 9% from 2001 to 2006 . This suggests that housing systems and climate did not cause the decrease seen m these Dutch slaughterhouses. As the meat inspection assessment procedure did not change since 2003 it is not expected that th1s caused the decrease. A spec1alised p1g veterinarian indicated in an interview that. although commumcation towards pig producers about the financ1al consequences of roundworm mfections started before 2004 , pig producers started to actually take control measures only after the Introduction of the price reduct1on He argued that the d1rect negat1ve financial consequences for the producers lead to them taking control measures to reduce liver lesion incidence. Increased efforts to control liver lesions should show through an increase in the amount of purchased and used anthelmentica. LEI's Farm Accountancy Data Network dataset includes the medicine use of around 70 1nd1vidual pig producers in the Netherlands. These data showed that the amount of anthelmentica bought Increased with 15% from 2004 to 2005. Th1s mdicated that Dutch p1g producers were more inclined to adm1n1ster a worm treatment in 2005, confirming our hypothesis of the price reduction effect. This research showed the effect of a change in mcentive mechanism. It did not show why producers changed the1r management and therefore cannot Indicate what leads to different reactions between farmers . To better understand farm decision making and to more effectively design new 1ncent1ve mechanisms on an individual producer level we need an understanding of the reasons why individual producers reacted the way they d1d to this change.
Conclusion and further research
The mtroduction of an md1vidual financ1al mcentive mechanism for livers with les1ons, a price reduct1on in the payment to p1g producers, effectively put the financ1al burden on mdividual producers, leadmg to increased activities to control the causes . The mean liver les1on 1nc1dence decreased from 8% in 2003 -when a collect1ve msurance was 1n place -to 5% 1n 2006 , after the change to the pnce reduct1on . Of the producers, 68% reduced liver les1on incidence. Of the producers with an mcrease 83% showed only a low increase (less than 5%). We conclude that the price reduction of €1 was effective m reducmg the mean liver lesion incidence, although large differences between individual prodtJcers exist. Further research 1s needed to determ1ne what causes these differences.
